Cartesianism-scepticism-atheism: these are the keywords of the philosophico-theological conflict waged by the Dutch Calvinists during the early years of the Enlightenment. Central to this dispute was the application of Cartesian tenets to theology, an issue which gave rise to a vehement discussion about scepticism and atheism. In the Dutch Reformed church the debate on scepticism in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries thus took place within the conflict over the reception of the "new philosophy".
DUTCH REFORMED ORTHODOXY AND ATHEISM IN THE EARLY ENLIGHTENMENT
By the late seventeenth century Dutch Reformed orthodoxy had developed into a complex entity.' The formularies of unity as laid down by the national Synod of Dort (1618-1619) formed its basis. This common ground, however, did not prevent the emergence of a variety of theological and political ideas within the orthodox boundaries. It was this diversity which in due course gave rise to discussions about toleration. Thus one of the main issues raised in the latter part of the seventeenth century was the question of whether those members of the church who taught that every human being should raise doubts-even if only once in his lifeabout God's existence ought to be tolerated. Might such a dangerous, irreligious throng not seduce others into treading upon the path leading first to that perilous phenomenon, scepticism, and then inevitably to that devilish monster: atheism? Fear of a steady expansion of atheism is one of the characteristics of religious literature in the early Enlightenment.
2 What exactly the term "atheism" means in early modern times is hard to define.' The concept was seldom intended to include genuine disbelievers, but, mainly because of polemics, it was used to depict 1 Cf. Paul Dibon, "Scepticisme et orthodoxie reformée dans la Hollande du Siècle d'Or" in Scepticism from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment, eds. Richard H. Popkin, Charles B. Schmitt, Wiesbaden: Wolfenbüttler Forschungen 35, 1987 55-81.-p. 55 . 2 For an illuminating treatment of the concept the early Enlightenment, see the "Introduction" by Alan Charles Kors to a volume of essays on this topic: Anticipations of the Enlightenment in England, France and Germany, eds Russell, London: Croom Helm, 1988; Alan Charles Kors, Atheism in France, 1650 -1729 , Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990 a wide variety of supposedly irreligious views which were inextricably linked to a loose moral life. 4 Whether or not the atheistic threat was as real as the popularity of apologetic literature against all sorts of "atheists" might seem to indicate, there was undoubtedly a genuine fear of the theological implications of the works by Isaac La Peyrère, Thomas Hobbes, Louis Meyer, Benedictus Spinoza, and Richard Simon. Their views were thought, not without reason, to endanger the status of revealed religion. The attack on miracles and prophecies, such essential proofs of the truth of the Christian religion; questions about the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch; the value of biblical chronology; the role of reason in explaining Scripturewere all regarded as casting doubt upon the divine authority of the Bible and the belief in a providential God. They paved the way first to deism, then to scepticism, and finally to atheism.
It was certainly people like La Peyrère, Hobbes and Spinoza whom orthodox Calvinist divines had in mind when they looked for the most prominent representatives of irreligion and antiChristianity, but there was also another phenomenon which they held responsible for the creation of an atheistic climate: Cartesianism. This new philosophy, more than anything else (even more than Spinozism, since this was considered to be the illegitimate offspring of Cartesianism), dominated the debate on irréli-gion among Dutch Reformed divines in the early Enlightenment. It was Cartesianism, together with Cocceianism, that almost led to a rift within the Reformed church comparable to the schism of 1619 between Remonstrants and Contraremonstrants. How had this religious war come about? In the early 1640s an anti-Cartesian party had come into being within the Dutch Reformed church which abhorred the "dangerous novelties" spread by the French Roman Catholic immigrant Descartes. Gisbertus Voetius, professor of theology and the pillar of Calvinist orthodoxy, was its leader. From his base in Utrecht, the anti-Cartesian bastion, Voetius planned a careful strategy to combat Descartes and his "atheistic" ideas.
5 Then in the 1650s, within the Reformed church, there emerged what we may call a pro-Cartesian party which embraced the new philosophy, although mainly with moderation. These divines were associated with the theology of Johannes Cocceius who, from 1650 till his death in 1669, lectured at Leiden university, for some time regarded as the centre of Cartesianism.
6
From then on the Dutch Reformed church was divided between these two camps and it seemed as if the times of the Remonstrants and Contraremonstrants had returned, a fact which was not lost on contemporaries. The Voetians loved to call the Cocccians the lawful heirs of Arminius: to strengthen their case the classis Goes went even so far as to draw up five articles in which Cocceian doctrines were condemned. Like their own forelathers, the Contraremonstrants, they wanted to have these new Arminians condemned at a national synod and expelled from the church. In the 1690s they made a request to the stadholder, King William III (whom they looked upon as the "author pietatis", "defensor fidei" and "impiorum severus hostis") to convoke a national synod in order to achieve this, but he refused, and with this defeat the Voetians entered into decline while the Cocceians became dominant. Not all Reformed divines sided with one or other party: some, such as Samuel Maresius, Balthasar Bekker, and Herman Witsius, did not belong, or at any rate did not want to belong, to either but chose to go their own way, although they did take part in the controversy.
The whole of Dutch Calvinist orthodoxy was involved in this religious war, in which theological, philosophical, political and social factors intervened. What had begun as a dispute between Voetius and Descartes extended into a national conflict between the members of the Reformed church. While Voetius might at first have cherished the illusion that he was fighting against a van Johannes Coccejus (1M3-1669) , Ede: ADC, 1988. popish enemy, an alien in the Protestant church, he and his followers soon became acutely aware that the enemy had crept into their church and had even won many adherents-and a more intensive anti-Cartesian campaign began.
7 Not only were academic institutions deeply engaged in it (apart from Leiden, Franeker was an important Cartesian-Cocceian centre), but learned ministers in towns and villages in the country also played a conspicuous part in the quarrel. It was a debate, moreover, carried on among the common people, who were neatly informed about the developments via public sermons. In one of the provinces they even went so far as to replace the usual Sunday afternoon sermon on the Heidelberg Catechism by sermons on the Cocceian-Voetian dispute. Many pamphlets were published in Dutch, so their contents were generally accessible.
8
A glance at the "catalogues of errors" drawn up by Voetians gives an idea of the main issues. One of them was the "theologia prophetica", which was intensely pursued by theology was intended to serve as an apologetic instrument to ward off the sceptical and atheist assault on Scripture: the accomplishment of biblical prophecies proved the divine authority of the Scriptures. This form of apologetics became as popular as another contemporary beloved apologetic means: physicotheology, and both were simultaneously put forward in the defence ofChristianity.
9
One of the interesting things about the Cocceians is that while on the one hand they embraced Cartesianism, on the other they developed this "prophetic theology". For the Voetians the reason of this association was clear: the Cocceians discovered the same harmony and order in the biblical prophecies as they loved in Descartes' philosophy. Although this apologetic genre did not flourish among the Voetians, we cannot deny that (semi-)millenarian notions were also cherished by many followers of Voetius. Furthermore, both camps had a pietistic strain in their theology, the Voetians being the exponents of the so-called "Further Reformation" ("Nadere Reformatie"), while the pietistic Cocceians were labelled as "serious" Cocceians. Thanks to those pietists on both sides the Voetians and Cocceians would be reconciled in the course of the eighteenth century.
In the late seventeenth century, however, there were sufficient points of debate left to keep these Calvinist brothers at a hostile distance from one another. One of the dominant themes was the relationship between theology and philosophy, so inextricably linked that changes in the one would directly affect the other: new philosophy would bring in new divinity. 10 This was not lost on the Voetians, who clung to Aristotelian-scholastic philosophy, being, Seventeenth-Century Thought, Leiden: Brill, 1992. 10 See the remark by Simon Patrick, A Brief Account of the New Sect of Latitude Men, London 1662, p. 22: "philosophy and divinity are so interwoven by the schoolmen, that it cannot be safe to separate them; new philosophy will bring in new divinity" (quoted in: B.C. Southgate, "Forgotten and Lost': Some Reactions however, first of all eclectics." Although he was not a pure anti-scholastic, Cocceius strove only to make use of scriptural terms in theology 12 and was thus not much concerned with the old philosophy-or any philosophy whatsoever, Cartesianism included. He always displayed a certain caution when asked about his views on Cartesianism, and when it was pointed out to him that some of his theological ideas were similar to those of Descartes he merely remarked that he had come to those conclusions long before Descartes." Nevertheless, he seems not to have been unfavourable to Cartesianism. A polemical writer would call him "un double Descartes". 14 Most of Cocceius's followers were less cautious about their views on the new philosophy, and contemporaries were struck by the fact that Cocceianism and Cartesianism often went hand in hand: like Samson's foxes they were turned tail to tail, putting a firebrand in the Reformed church between two tails (Judges lf>:l, 5). It was said that nobody could be a good Cocceian without being a Cartesian-an observation which was denied by Heidanus.
1 ' Apparently this alliance was not of a merely external nature, as has been asserted, both then and later, but was based on philosophico-theological grounds.
1 " At any rate, a Cartesian way of The alliance between Cocceianism and Cartesianism caused astonishment in the 17th century as well as in later times. Thus Jacques Basnage wrote in his Annales des Provinces-Unies I, The Hague 1726, p. 456: "Ce parti [the Cocceians], foible dans sa naissance, s'apuia des Cartésiens, malgré l'incompatibilité de leurs thinking was introduced by the Cocceians into theology, on which it was to exert a deep and prolonged influence. While the Cocceians expected many good things for religion from the new philosophy for religion-it was a perfect means to combat atheism-, the Voctians considered Cartesianism a threat to Christianity which would lead immediately to atheism. The latter found themselves confirmed in their sombre expectations by radical expressions of "Cartesian theology" which came to the lore in the 1660s.
One of the incisive events in the religious conflict was the publication of Louis Meyer's Philosophia Sanctae Scripturae interpres. The year of its publication, 1666, might be regarded as the starting point of a new phase in the history of Dutch Cartesianism. To some contemporaries, such as the Scottish theologian and millenarian John Durie, it was no coincidence that this was the year both of the curious events around the Jewish pseudoMessiah Sabbatai Sevi and the publication of Meyer's book: it was God's will that Christians should now reach agreement among themselves about a firm and infallible rule for the exegesis of Scripture. That rule could be presented to the Jews in the hope that they would also accept it unanimously. Thus Meyer's work opened the door to the unity between Christians and Jews thereby hastening the coming of Christ's millenial kingdom.
17 However principes, puisque l'un adopte sans peine un sens mystique, qui dépend de la vivacité de l'esprit, et du feu de l'imagination des Interprètes, et que l'autre a bâti son système sur cette maxime, qu'on ne doit croire que les choses, dont on a des Idées évidentes, claires et distinctes". J. A. Cramer (Abraham Heidanus, [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] 156) declares that the alliance was a purely external one. Schrenk (Gottesreich und liund, [20] [21] says that this might be true in Heidanus's case, but that one may wonder whether it can be maintained as a general thesis, adding: "Dies vermochte nur eine eingehende Geschichte des Coccejanismus herausstellen" (p. 22, note 1). Since such a history still has to be written, it is difficult to make any more specific comment. Thijssen-Schoute is of the opinion that, besides external factors, there are also internal motives for the alliance, see Nederlands Cartésia-nisme, 34-35, and "Le cartésianisme aux Pays-Bas", p. 241 ("Avouons du moins que les thèmes cartésiens et les thèmes coccéiens se sont trop intimement pénétrés pour que l'on puisse affirmer avec Cramer, que les liens qui les rattachent ont toujours été des liens purement extérieurs). McGahagan goes on in the same line, pointing to the concept of "fides implicita" as the binding factor of the otherwise mysterious association of Cartesianism and Cocceianism" (Cartesianism in the Netherlands, p. 364 ff. 
1H
After Meyer's work had caused so much excitement in religious and philosophical circles, the subsequent debate on Cartesianism was marked by a series of episodes. The political events of 1672 (the fall of De Witt and the States' party and the rise of William III and the Orangist party) occasioned a change in the relations between Voetians and Cocceians, the star of the first quickly rising, while the latter were pushed back into a less favourable position. The Cocceians were accused of being pro-French: so fond of the philosophy of a papist Frenchman, why would they not betray to the French enemy their country as well? The Voetians, with William III as their protector, felt sufficiently secure to reinforce their assault on the "innovators" and "rationalists" who paved the way to "impious atheism" within the Reformed church.
The year 1676 thus saw the dismissal of the grand old man of Cartesianism, the nearly 80-year old Leiden professor Abraham Heidanus, while in the same year, through the intervention of William III, two Cocceian-Cartesian ministers, Willem Momma and Johannes van der Waeyen, were dismissed from their Middelburg (Zeeland) posts.
19 Although 1676 is sometimes considered the culmination of the history of Cartesianism in the Dutch Republic, 8 In 1669 the Theological Faculty of Leiden expressed its very unfavourable opinion of Meyer's book. Its advice was signed by Heidanus and Cocceius.
19 After his dismissal from Middelburg Johannes van der Waeyen was appointed professor of theology at Franeker. The more liberal Frisian court felt some rivalry towards William III and sometimes supported the appointment of scholars who were out of favour with William III. Van der Waeyen was one of the beloved targets of the Voetians, since he had been a staunch Voetian before he had gone over to Cocceianism around 1670. During his Voetian period Van der Waeyen had attacked the Cartesians, accusing them of scepticism and atheism. After he had joined the Cocceians the Voetians liked to confront him time and again with his earlier anti-Cartesian observations. the story certainly did not end there. In the early 1680s an episode concerning the Frisian minister David Flud van Giffen gave rise to a prolonged national discussion on Cartesianism and Cocceianism in which many prominent theologians took part. 20 The Van Gifien affair was soon followed by the case of Herman Alexander Röell, professor in Franeker, whose brand of Cartesian theology would be labelled as dangerous "Röellianism", causing dismay within Calvinist orthodoxy well into the eighteenth century. 21 Then, in the early 1690s, Balthasar Bekker published his Betoverde Weereld ("The Enchanted World"), the propositions of which were clearly inspired by Cartesianism. 22 In the first decade of the eighteenth century the Walloon preacher Pierre de Joncourt rekindled the (lames by publishing some satirical dialogues between Cocceians and Voetians.
23 Several years later a fierce dispute arose on Cartesianism and Spinozism between the two Franeker professors Ruardus Andala and Johannes Regius.
24 Eighteenth-century Calvinist theologians continued to write that Cartesianism had constituted the hot-bed of all libertinisms, including "bastard-Cartesianism" or Spinozism, which flourished in their time.
25 So Descartes was able to engage people's-polemical-energy in the Dutch Republic until nearly a century after he had come to live there.
All this is familiar to the historian of Dutch Cartesianism. However, the theological aspects of the Dutch debate on Cartesianism have not yet received due attention. A thorough examination of Cocceian theology will throw more light upon the exact nature of the alliance between Cocceianism and Cartesian theology, and may thus show how this complex of theological and philosophical ideas contributed to the moderate Enlightenment so typical of Dutch culture. Among Cocceius's friends and followers we meet with moderate as well as with more radical views. Prominent Cocceians and Cartesians such as Christoph Wittich, Abraham Heidanus and his son-in-law Frans Burman (who taught in the Voetian stronghold of Utrecht) were convinced that doubt was permissible as an instrument with which arrive at the truth. Heidanus, however, regarded "the injurious opinions of Academicians and Pyrrhonists" as one of t lie causes of atheism.
w Burman observed that it was never permissible to be uncertain about God's existence. We should, however, only assent to this truth on the most solid grounds. Such a doubt was not so much doubt about God's existence as about man's notion of God's existence. This view was shared by someone like the prominent CocceianCartesian minister of Enkhuizen, Henricus Groenewegen, who interpreted doubt about God's existence as doubt about man himself; about whether he took sufficient note of the reasons which showed him the perfection and necessity of the divine being. According to these men, therefore, doubt about God's existence had to be regarded as subjective rather than as objective. 29 Salomon van Til, pointing to the dangers of atheism, quoted the French apologist David Derodon in order to show that the most dangerous of the irreligious are those who subtly lead others to raise doubts about divine matters." 1 Timotheus Verinus gave the following explanation of Cartesian doubt. If it were really true that some theologians taught that we should doubt whether God exists it would be the most horrible heresy. But nobody taught such a doctrine. Verinus explained that " Cocceius, Opera anecdota, Ep. 441.
• Descartes, when involved in a dialogue with a sceptic, wanted to convince him on his own grounds. Descartes had declared he had done this as a philosopher who seeks certitude and truth in nature, and that doubt was to be equated with suspension ofjudgement. So the crux of the matter was whether a philosopher might examine the reasons in nature for accepting something as true, and whether he might thus prove that there is a God and through examination discover the grounds of this truth, all for the purpose of convincing atheists.
3 ' One of the main participants in the Cocceian-Voetian debate on Cartesianism and scepticism was Petrus Allinga, a learned minister in a small village in Noord-Holland. 32 Allinga, who has hitherto remained somewhat obscure, is an eminent representative of those religious and philosophical thoughts characterized by notions of both Cocceianism and Cartesianism. In philosophical matters he embraced the concepts of Descartes, while in theology he was attracted to the ideas of Cocceius. He declared that the thought of these two men might be extremely useful in order to confirm the doctrine of the Reformed church. 33 As to the alliance between Cocceianism and Cartesianism Allinga observed that among the Cocceians and Cartesians there reigned a "unio animorum". The causes of this union were manifest-"consensus in fundamentalibus, libertas in philosophicis, veritatum mutua amicitia, unionis nécessitas ob communes veritatis hostes".
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Allinga emphasized that he did not follow Descartes in every respect. He therefore thought it unfair to derive arguments from Descartes' works in order to attack people like himself. Descartes had not been a member of the Dutch Reformed church and thus could not be presented as a proclaimer of novelties within it, Allinga insisted-otherwise all the horrible doctrines of the papist scholastics, whose philosophy was so highly esteemed by many Reformed divines, should also be reckoned among the sins of the church. Allinga only wanted to regard as followers of Cartesianism those who belonged to the Reformed church. Other Cartesians, he said, were irrelevant to the debate.
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It was the discussion between Allinga and Herman Witsius, caused by the latter's famous Twist des Heeren met sijn wijngaert (1669) that started the debate between the Cartesian theologians and the anti-Cartesians, in which the question of complete doubt played such a major part. In the tracts which appeared during this debate, and which led in their turn to fierce discussions with prominent Voetians such as Melchior Leydekker and Leonardus Rijssenius, Allinga defended the Cartesian method of doubt. As the first often "special examples of miraculous and strange novelties" Witsius advanced the proposition that man, in order to attain the truth, should raise doubts about anything, even about God's existence. As the second "strange novelty" he mentioned the proposition that "God might deceive if He wanted to". According to Witsius doubt was not only the suspension of judgement but also regarding matters as false until one was convinced of their truth. This might lead to the abominable conclusion that during this period oif doubt we had denied God's existence.
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In his reply Allinga laid much stress on the interpretation of the term "dubitatio". In true Cartesian fashion he insisted that "dubitare" meant "to suspend judgement until we have found solid grounds for embracing the truth".
37 Interestingly enough-and more in the Cocceian tradition-he declared that he himself never used the term "dubitare" in order not to offend his Reformed brothers. 38 As he pointed out, however, all learned philosophers interpreted "dubitatio" as "suspension of judgement". to Frans Burman and Christophorus Wittichius who agreed with him; but they were not the only ones: Cocceius's son-in-law Willem Anslaar, who, under the pseudonym Philalethius Elicser, wrote an interesting tract on Cocceianism and Cartesianism, defended this view strongly.
39 Furthermore, Allinga emphasized that Descartes had made a distinction between "doubt" and "falsehood" and had certainly not equated those notions.
40
As to the charge of scepticism, Allinga pointed out that Descartes had distinguished between "to doubt" and "to persist in doubt", the latter being utterly rejected by the French philosopher. The sceptics, Allinga insisted, did not search for the truth by suspending their judgement; on the contrary, they gave their assent to what they thought was true not on the basis of solid grounds, but rather loosely. This unfounded assent was the cause of sceptical doubt, an incurable fluctuation which tore the sceptical mind apart. Without a well-based assent there would be no true religiosity, no comfort and certainty for man's soul.
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According to Allinga, then, Cartesianism was a perfect means to combat scepticism and atheism. Among the most important causes of atheism was the fact that man did not search for the fundamental and evident proofs given by nature of the truth of God's existence from their childhood onwards. Atheism had free play if this truth was not embraced upon solid grounds but merely as some vague rumour heard from one's parents. Man should only assent to the truth of God's existence on solid grounds, suspending his judgement until he can see those grounds.
42 "What should we do in order to assent to a proposition?", Allinga asked. Was it enough for it to be true in itself, although we do not see it as such? Or should we give our assent because we see that it is true? The first view was nonsensical. If, however, the second proposition was correct, it meant that we should not assent to the truth of God's existence without good reason. 43 Allinga was convinced that those who did not embrace their religion after a thorough investigation of its fundamental truths would fall into atheism at its first blow. That was why the Cartesian method was so important: it showed the way to certitude. It was as a consequence of the Fall, Allinga maintained, that man raised doubts as to whether God existed. Due to his spiritual blindness he did not see the grounds of this truth as clearly and distinctly as he did before the Fall. Whoever saw those grounds clearly, could be in no doubt any longer. How might one save oneself from this doubt? By embracing the truth of God's existence without any reason? This would not cure doubts, but only feed them. Man could only be helped by searching for solid grounds in order to assent to the truth of God's existence with a sagacious judgement. 44 To the Voetian charge that he and others taught men to doubt whether there is a God, Allinga replied that it was the Voetians who did that, since they denied that man possessed an innate idea of God and the concept of a perfect Being. Such doctrines led to doubt and atheism, Allinga declared.
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Universal doubt was thus one of the central issues advanced in the Cocceian-Voetian debate. The view that man had to raise doubts about God's existence was hotly debated by Dutch divines. Doubt about God's existence implied doubt about divine revelation, since that revelation presupposed the existence of a Revealer. This in its turn implied doubt about those revealed truths such as the Trinity, Christ's mediatorial function, and so on. All this, moreover, would lead to doubt about divine laws and prescriptions, finally undermining worship and piety. 46 In one of his replies to Allinga, entitled Het aenstootelijcke nieuw in waerheyt en liefde ontdeckt ("Exceptionable Novelties in Truth and Love Discovered"), Witsius dealt extensively with doubt about God's existence. Quoting from Descartes' works he referred, like many Voetians, to the fact that this philosopher had dared to call doubt about God's existence pious and respectable. For Witsius it was clear that Descartes' doubt was to be equated with "being uncertain" and "persisting in doubt", despite the passage quoted by him in which Descartes rejected such an attitude. To doubt was not only "to suspend judgement", as Allinga insisted, but it was also "to be unsure about something" and "to consider anything as false so long as one is in doubt". If we could make a person believe that "dubitatio" meant "suspension of judgement", we might also teach men to eat hay. Or had the Cartesians not only invented a new philosophy but a new language as well . . .?
47 If "dubitare" really meant this, however, why not just say that we should not assent to important matters, let alone divine matters, without any good reason? In that case I would agree immediately and our conflict would be solved, Witsius declared.
48 Allinga replied that Witsius had hit the nail on the head: this was exactly what he meant by "dubitatio". He regarded Witsius's interpretation of the term as proof of the fact that he had sided with Allinga and his friends. 49 Witsius's remark indeed indicated a common ground on which Calvinist and Cartesian rationalism could meet.
Witsius wondered why Descartes so often emphasized that such doubt as he proposed might not be extended to matters of faith? Why all that talk about casting doubt upon matters evident to all? Don't think, reader, Witsius declared in an attempt to ridicule the frightening aspects of sceptical doubts, that those people doubt whether they have hands or feet, head or brains, and so on as a joke-no, they are quite serious about it. Maybe you will think it absurd that a sensible man say to himself "there are no human beings in the world, no bakers, no brewers, no bread, wine, ghosts, etc.; all I have seen, heard, felt, tasted, smelled up hitherto has only been a dream, fruits of my imagination, so I have to consider these things as false". Ridiculous as this might be, Witsius proceeded, it was not impious as long as we did not apply such doubt to God. However, Descartes had not hesitated to do exactly that, saying that as long as man was in doubt about God's existence he should regard this truth as false, as a mere fable, and assert that there is no God. Of course such propositions were detested by Witsius, who approvingly quoted Cocceius's words that it was never permissible, under any circumstances whatever, to doubt whether there is a God.
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A systematic treatment of universal doubt is given by one of Allinga's other opponents, the Voetian minister Leonardus Rijssenius in his tract De oude rechtsinnige waerheyt verdonckert en bedeckt door Descartes, Coccejus, Wittich, Burman, Wolzogen, Peri^on, Groenewegen, Allinga etc. en 51 Rijssenius's method is first to give a Cartesian proposition and then his own reply to it. In the 42 propositions on doubt, which are to be found in the first chapter significantly entitled "Cartesian doubt paves the way to atheism", Rijssenius gives quotations from works by Descartes, Bassecour, Clauberg, Wittichius, Groenewegen, Burman, and above all Allinga.
The first proposition concerns the observation that he who seeks the truth should cast doubt upon anything once in his life. Rijssenius denies that the method of doubt is necessary to gain the truth: we can have sure knowledge about matters which we never call into question. Doubt is the opposite of faith: they have nothing to do with each other. Rijssenius also denies that we should be in doubt in order to clear our mind of any prejudices and false opinions: false opinions should certainly be rejected, but does this mean that we should reject everything? Should we also be in doubt about true opinions? Is this not rooting up the wheat with the tares (Matthew 13: 29)? The proposition that we should raise doubts in order to prevent errors is countered by the observation that if we are in doubt, we are in error.
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The major part of this chapter on Cartesian doubt is devoted to doubt about God's existence. Naturally Rijssenius denies that such doubt is permissible. Man does well if he believes that there is one God (James 2: 19), and badly if he questions it. Doubt can be equated with unbelief. He who is in doubt whether there is a God is without God and a Saviour during that time. (Eph. 2:12; 3:12, 17) . Rijssenius is shocked by the proposition advanced by Burman and Allinga that we should embrace the truth of God's existence only on the most solid grounds. This is a flagrant attack on God's authority, for according to these theologians we are not allowed to say that there is a God on the basis of God's Word: they proclaim that we should first investigate whether God's Word is true. The Cartesian theologians who believe that such a truth might only be accepted because man sees a reason to do so imply, as Rijssenius points out, that children and simple folk who are unable to undertake such an investigation are not allowed to embrace the truth, and that they may not be told by others what to believe. Now this is SCEPTICISM IN THE EARLY DUTCH ENl.IGHTEMMEXT 139 sheer nonsense. Rijssenius declares, insisting that belief does not require any proofs from nature. Belief precedes all investigation. Finally, Allinga's suggestion that it is not permissible to be in doubt within the boundaries of the church but only where one seeks the truth, leads Rijssenius to declare that, if this were so, a philosopher or a doubter could not be a member of the church and that such people might be excommunicated. This was exactly what Rijssenius wanted: to have the Cocceian-Cartesian divines driven away from the Reformed church.
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As for the interpretation by Clauberg and Allinga of "dubitare" as suspension ofjudgement, Rijssenius insisted that even if to doubt might be explained in this way, it was still sinful, because it implied first lack of belief, and secondly that one did not have knowledge of God, which is a sin (1 Cor. 15: 34). Allinga himself had declared that man's doubts about God were the consequence of the Fall. Well then, they were sinful, Rijssenius concluded, adding that such a suspension ofjudgement also suspended the works of love, fear and obedience to God and thus turned man into a practical atheist.
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Rijssenius returned to an issue which was also advanced by Witsius and other anti-Cartesians about the equation of doubt and falsehood: if we considered the issue about which we doubted false during the time we doubt, the truth of God's existence might also be regarded as false during that period. How long could this doubt last? Wittichius, Groenewegen, and Allinga had replied: until we are fully assured. Rijssenius concluded that the Jews consequently did not sin when they did not embrace Jesus as their Saviour so long as they saw no reason for doing so. Allinga had declared that a Jew should not simply believe that Jesus was the true Messiah, but should suspend his judgement until he saw solid grounds for assenting to this truth. Rijssenius insisted, however, that during this suspension the Jews remained the property of the devil. This way of reasoning, he added, also implied that the Socinians did not sin when they did not accept the Trinity and the resurrection of the flesh and so on, and that they were not doomed for not accepting those truths.
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Rijssenius's attack on Allinga and other Cocceians and Cartesians was soon followed by assaults by Melchior Leydekker and Voetius's successor, Petrus van Mastricht. Leydekker accused the "innovators" of "Scepticismus, Atheismus, Apostasia a fide Reformatae Ecclesiae". 56 Due to the influence of Cocceian theology and Cartesian philosophy the greatest mysteries of the faith had been so forged on the anvil of novelty as not to bear the faintest resemblance to the Confession of faith any more. Leydekker implored the States General to put an end to the spread of this cancer. 57 Allinga in his turn accused Leydekker of ignorance, since he did not seem to know that "dubitatio" was in itself an innocent word, which had always been used with caution by philosophers. Its meaning had been distorted by those who did not love the truth. To the inexpert it might mean an "ambigua fluctuatie mentis inter quaedam extrema", but to those "studiosi" who sought the truth, it meant a suspension of judgement and a close scrutiny of the truth.
sa Van Mastricht's Novitatum Cartesianarum Gangraena . . . seu theologia cartesiana détecta (despite its title a moderate and lucid, systematic treatment of Cartesian and Cocceian matters) started with an extensive attack on Cartesian doubt in which he advanced more or less the same arguments which had been put forward by his fellow Voetians.
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Thus the pattern set by Voetius to equate Cartesianism with atheism was enthusiastically upheld by his followers who, more than an earlier generation of anti-Cartesians, stressed the atheistic implications of Cartesian doubt.
CONCLUSION
The Cocceian-Voetian conflict offers an instructive insight into the reception of Cartesianism in the orthodox Calvinist world of the early Enlightenment. By focusing on Cartesian doubt as one of the major issues in this debate, we can see how it made seventeenthand eighteenth-century Calvinist divines acutely aware of the danger of irreligion. Both parties, Voetians as well as Cocceians, were deeply engaged in the struggle against irreligion. Each interpreted this phenomenon in their own way, however, and attempted to find a convincing means of defending Christianity. The Voetians feared that "Cartesian theology" as developed by the Cocceians would undermine Calvinist orthodoxy. Perhaps they saw the dangers of the sceptical challenge to orthodox theology more clearly than the Cocceians.
The Cocceians were convinced that the certainty offered by Cartesianism would reinforce the Christian religion and thus convince the atheists of the truth of Christianity. Uncertainty, caused by lack of independent investigation of fundamental religious truths, was seen by these divines as a major factor contributing to the growth of atheism. According to them the only way out of this crisis was to apply the Cartesian method of doubt to theology. They thus brought about a severe crisis within Calvinist orthodoxy itself, a crisis that changed the face of Dutch Reformed orthodoxy for good. By their attempt to create a synthesis between Calvinism and Cartesianism the Cocceians made a considerable contribution to the development of the rationalistic supranaturalism of the Calvinist Dutch Enlightenment. Besides Cartesianism the Cocceians provided another way out of the religious crisis of their day by developing a "prophetic theology". In this respect they can be seen as the Dutch representatives of international scholarly interest in the "studium propheticum" which captured so many minds in the age of the Enlightenment.
So when the French Calvinist Pierre Bayle emerged on the Dutch scene and prepared his Dictionnaire historique et critique there were vehement discussions going on among Dutch Calvinists about scepticism. It was this Cocceian-Voetian debate on Cartesianism (its bastard, Spinozism, included) that constituted a major part of the Dutch historical background against which Bayle's discussion of the subject must be seen. 
